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INTRODUCTION

Two things differentiate a surveillance state from a non-surveillance
state: the ease of government access to personal data and the strength of a
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country’s human rights legal framework. Both are being profoundly altered
by recent transnational legal efforts, collectively called mutual legal
assistance (MLA) treaty (MLAT) reform, aimed at facilitating cross-border
data access for law enforcement. MLATs enable law enforcement agencies
to obtain evidence located in foreign countries, including personal data and
other electronic evidence.1 Reform efforts are necessitated by the failure of
slow and complex traditional MLA procedures to meet growing law
enforcement demands, as well as uncertainty about jurisdiction over data
results in international disputes. However, in the rush to mollify law
enforcement agencies, and the attention demanded by complex procedural
and jurisdictional issues, human rights protections tend to be an
afterthought. If this continues, governments may unwittingly produce the
conditions that give rise to surveillance states all over the world.
The desire to reduce legal complications associated with cross-border
data access is understandable. A criminal investigator in country A, for
example, may need access to the content of an e-mail sent by one of its
nationals via Google’s Gmail, but may wait for months, while the request
percolates through the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States
(U.S.) federal court system. Governments in country A and the U.S. may
disagree over which has jurisdiction over the data—country A may have
jurisdiction over the suspect and location of the crime, while the data may
be held by a U.S. company subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This may be all the
more complicated when the data is stored on a server in country B, which
may argue that the data’s physical presence in its territory gives neither
country A nor the U.S. jurisdiction over it.
Some states respond by empowering themselves to circumvent the
MLA process with problematic new domestic policies. One tactic is
mandated data localization, which forces service providers to store user
data on servers within a state’s territory. This undermines Internet and web
openness, which is crucial to its functioning. Another tactic is for a
government to grant itself the legal authority to demand access to data
regardless of where the data are stored. This arguably undermines the
principle of state sovereignty.
MLAT reform is necessary to disincentivize these problematic
unilateral measures, reinforce state sovereignty, and remove barriers to
effective law enforcement. Yet, to varying degrees, recently proposed and
enacted measures, including the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Use of Overseas
Data (CLOUD) Act, the European Union’s (EU) e-Evidence proposal, and
the potential Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s
Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), would expedite access
at the expense of legal norms protecting state sovereignty and procedures
designed to protect personal data, privacy, and other human rights
interests.2 Only one proposal, a draft legal instrument for an International

1
See generally, Mailyn Fidler, MLAT Reform: Some Thoughts from Civil Society, LAWFARE
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-thoughts-civil-society; Greg
Nojeim, MLAT Reform: A Straw Man Proposal, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://cdt.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-03-MLAT-Reform-Post_Final-1.pdf; Arthur Rizer & Anne
Hobson, Cross-Border Data Requests: Evaluating Reforms to Improve Law Enforcement Access,
RSTREET (Nov. 2017), http://2o9ub0417chl2lg6m43em6psi2i.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/120.pdf.
2
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). This
Act is also known as the CLOUD Act. The two elements of the e-Evidence proposal are a
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production
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Data Access Warrant, introduced by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
right to privacy, adequately addresses human rights issues, wait-times for
law enforcement, and state sovereignty.3
While MLAT reform revolves around a set of relatively technical and
esoteric legal issues, policymakers must not lose sight of the potentially
Orwellian impact that poorly-designed MLAT reform could have on
human rights and democratic institutions. Any long-term solution must
compensate for lost legal protections to ensure that expanded government
data collection powers are not abused.

I. THERE IS A LEGITIMATE AND PRESSING NEED FOR MLAT REFORM
A. THE U.S. MLA PROCESS IS TOO SLOW AND INEFFICIENT
MLA processes in the U.S., where most computer records are
requested, are too slow and inefficient to meet foreign law enforcement
demands.4 MLA requests for data held by U.S. companies typically entail
months-long wait-times, impeding law enforcement efforts all over the
world.
Foreign governments utilize the U.S. MLA process to obtain warrants
and court orders necessary to access data controlled by U.S. tech
companies.5 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
generally prohibits a U.S. company from providing communications
content to a foreign government outside of the MLA process.6 While
companies are free to disclose non-content data, they often refrain from
doing so, necessitating use of the MLA process.7
The U.S. MLA process is complex. To obtain a U.S. warrant or court
order, a foreign law enforcement agency must first seek approval from a
specialized domestic “central authority.”8 If approved, the request is sent to

and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters. Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders
for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters, COM (2018) 225 final (Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter
Draft Regulation]; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying
Down Harmonised Rules on the Appointment of Legal Representatives for the Purpose of
Gathering Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, COM (2018) 226 final (Apr. 4, 2018) [hereinafter
Draft Directive]; Council of Europe, Terms of Reference for the Preparation of a Draft 2nd
Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMM. (June 9, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/terms-of-reference-for-the-preparation-of-a-draft-2ndadditional-proto/168072362b [hereinafter Terms of Reference]; Convention on Cybercrime
(Budapest Convention), Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185 [hereinafter Budapest Convention]; Joseph A.
Cannataci (United Nations (U.N.) Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy), Working Draft
Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy, Version 0.7 (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/2018AnnualReportAppendix7.pdf
[hereinafter Draft Legal Instrument].
3
Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2.
4
Council of Europe, T-CY Assessment Report: The Mutual Legal Assistance Provisions of the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMM. 61–81 (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://rm.coe.int/16802e726c [hereinafter T-CY Assessment Report].
5
See generally STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45173, CROSS-BORDER
DATA SHARING UNDER THE CLOUD ACT 12–14 (2018).
6
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018).
7
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6); Commission Staff Working Doc. Impact Assessment, at 27, SWD
(2018) 118 final (Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Impact Assessment].
8
TIFFANY LIN & MAILYN FIDLER, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., CROSS-BORDER DATA ACCESS
REFORM: A PRIMER ON THE PROPOSED U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENT 2–3 (2017); DEP’T OF JUST. CRIM.
DIV., FY 2016 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET].
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the DOJ’s Office of International Affairs (OIA), the U.S. central authority,
which determines whether it meets U.S. legal requirements, such as
whether the factual basis for suspicion amounts to probable cause.9 Once
satisfied, OIA sends the request to a U.S. Attorney’s Office, which brings
the case before a federal magistrate judge.10 If the judge approves the
request, he or she issues a warrant or order to the relevant company.11 The
company then sends the data to OIA, which determines whether it meets
data minimization and human rights requirements.12 OIA then sends the
data to the foreign government’s central authority, which supplies it to the
law enforcement agency.13
In addition to the complexity of this process, OIA’s workload
contributes to slow response times. Annual MLA requests for computer
records increased by over 1,000% between the years 2000 and 2014.14
Response times were roughly six to twenty-three months in 2014.15 In the
2016 fiscal year, there was an MLA request backlog, including noncomputer record requests, of 13,421 cases, though this has been reduced to
9,038 as a result of a one-off budget increase for additional staff.16
Currently, EU member states typically wait between one and six months
for access.17
Non-content data may be obtained directly from U.S. companies,
outside of the MLA process. An exception in ECPA permits companies to
disclose non-content data to foreign governments at their discretion.18
Despite receiving many more requests than OIA, U.S. companies comply
with requests far more quickly. For example, EU member states sent
around 120,000 requests to Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and
Twitter in 2016, with a typical response time of around eleven to thirty
days.19
This discrepancy—a wait-time of eleven to thirty days for direct
requests on the one hand, and a wait-time of one to six months for MLA
requests, on the other—frustrates foreign governments and undermines
their criminal justice systems.20

9

LIN & FIDLER, supra note 8, at 2.
Id. (though OIA may request data in a federal court without the assistance of a U.S.
Attorney, it often lacks the resources to do so); 18. U.S.C. § 3512 (1995); 2016 BUDGET, supra
note 8, at 24.
11
LIN & FIDLER, supra note 8, at 2.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Id.
14
2016 BUDGET, supra note 8, at 22–23.
15
T-CY Assessment Report, supra note 4, at 123 (describing a survey of thirty-six parties and
three observer states).
16
2016 BUDGET, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that seventy-seven additional attorneys and
paralegals were requested to be hired with the one-off budget increase of $32,111,000).
17
Impact Assessment, supra note 7, 263–64 (describing self-reported wait times, as measured
by the mode, for access to content and non-content data through non-EU government authorities;
the numbers mainly reflect United States’ requests).
18
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2711 (prohibiting disclosure to governmental
entities, which means only U.S. governmental entities); Impact Assessment, supra note 7, at 14
(discussing how non-content data is the most commonly sought category of data). Most state
parties to the Budapest Convention do not permit service providers to voluntarily disclose noncontent data.
19
Impact Assessment, supra note 7, at 194 (While this figure is calculated with both U.S. and
non-U.S. service provider response times, the number largely reflects U.S. companies, as they
receive the majority of requests.).
20
Id.; see also Andrew K. Woods, Interview: The British Perspective on the Cross-Border
Data Problem, LAWFARE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/interview-britishperspective-cross-border-data-problem.
10
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B. UNILATERAL MEASURES
Unsurprisingly, governments have begun to circumvent the U.S. MLA
process. Some now require service providers to store data within their
respective jurisdictions, rendering the MLA process irrelevant, while
others have given themselves authority through domestic law to demand
the production of data stored anywhere.
Data localization is one policy response to slow MLA processes.21
Germany and Russia, for example, require companies to store at least some
categories of personal data on servers located within state boundaries.22
While data localization allays more immediate concerns about response
times, it also generates more consequential problems. First, data
localization undermines Internet and web openness.23 The imposition of
territorial borders restricts a company’s ability to manage data traffic in
ways that enhance efficiency, security, and interoperability.24 Second, data
localization can be used as a pretext for more aggressive surveillance and
censorship.25
Another policy response, the use of domestic law to empower law
enforcement authorities or courts to demand its nationals’ data regardless
of where the data is stored, poses its own problems. While the argument
that jurisdiction over data should not be determined by physical location
may be sound, it lacks international consensus.26 Absent this consensus,
21
See, e.g., Jonah F. Hill and Matthew Noyes, Rethinking Data, Geography, and Jurisdiction:
Towards a Common Framework for Harmonizing Global Data Flow Controls, NEW AM. (2018),
https://www.newamerica.org/documents/2084/Rethinking_Data_Geography_Jurisdiction_2.21.pdf
; Peter Swire, Why Cross-Border Government Requests for Data Will Keep Becoming More
Important, LAWFARE (May 23, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-cross-bordergovernment-requests-data-will-keep-becoming-more-important.
22
See Gesetz zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrsdaten,
published Dec. 10, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BUNDES GBL] (Ger.) (Law on the Introduction of a
Storage Obligation and a Maximum Storage Period for Traffic Data) [translated]; Personal Data of
Russian Citizens Required to be Stored in Data Centers Located in Russia, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS
(2014), https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2014/08/personal-dataof-russian-citizens-required-to-be/files/14492--ipt-personal-data-of-russian-citizens-ne/fileattachment/14492--ipt-personal-data-of-russian-citizens--ne.pdf.
23
Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the Global
Internet, CA. INT’L L. CTR. 1, 4 (“By creating national barriers to data, data localization measures
break up the World Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the globe. The
Internet is a global network based on a protocol for interconnecting computers without regard for
national borders. Information is routed across this network through decisions made autonomously
and automatically at local routers, which choose paths based largely on efficiency, unaware of
political borders. Thus, the services built on the Internet, from email to the World Wide Web, pay
little heed to national borders. Services such as cloud computing exemplify this, making largely
invisible to users the physical locations for the storage and processing of their data. Data
localization would dramatically alter this fundamental architecture of the Internet.”).
24
See generally Erica Fraser, Data Localisation and The Balkanisation of the Internet, 13
SCRIPTED 359, 363 (2016), https://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/13-3-fraser.pdf;
Dillon Reisman, Where Is Your Data, Really?: The Technical Case Against Data Localization,
LAWFARE (May 22, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-your-data-really-technical-caseagainst-data-localization.
25
See, e.g., Adam Taylor, Russia Moves to Block Professional Networking Site LinkedIn, WASH.
POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/17/russiamoves-to-block-professional-networking-site-linkedin/?utm_term=.10f8ce92e2a6 (“The aim of this law
is to create . . . (another) quasi-legal pretext to close Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and all other services . .
. The aim is surveillance, obviously—to make servers of the companies accessible to the Russian
national system of online surveillance . . . and also to get the Internet giants effectively landed in Russia.”
(citations omitted)).
26
See generally DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, SOLVING THE INTERNET JURISDICTION PUZZLE
(2017).
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direct access to cross-border data will generate confusion and international
discord following real or perceived violations of state sovereignty.27
C. SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The mismatch between the traditional territorial conception of state
sovereignty in international law, and the non-territorial nature of the web
and Internet, results in uncertainty and disagreements about which state has
jurisdiction over sought-after data.
Generally, a state has exclusive jurisdiction in law enforcement
matters within its territorial borders.28 The government of one state may
not exercise its law enforcement powers within the territory of another
state absent the second state’s permission.29 Absent permission, if one state
compels an entity to hand over data stored in another state for a law
enforcement investigation in the first state, it would arguably be an
impermissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.30
In contrast, the Internet and web are generally non-territorial.31 The
data storage practices of tech companies tend not to follow jurisdictional
boundaries. Not only are data stored in multiple jurisdictions, but their
locations shift over time, and they can be duplicated or split into
fragments.32 Decisions about which server(s) will host a user’s data depend
on the user’s location, the type of data, and cost considerations, among
other things.33 Given that data sought in investigations are stored in a
dynamic, borderless way, states may disagree over which has jurisdiction
over the data and authority to compel their disclosure.34 Confusion about
jurisdiction may cause one state to unwittingly violate the sovereignty of
another.35
When the U.S. government demanded that Microsoft hand over data
stored in Ireland outside of the MLA process, Microsoft argued that this
would be “the same as if U.S. agents bearing a warrant directed Hilton to
send a housekeeper into a hotel room in Dublin, photograph a guest’s
papers, and email the copies to Washington. It is the execution of a search
27
Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 142985) (arguing that “the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . ensures that courts do not
trigger international discord—like the outcry that the Government’s order to Microsoft has
prompted from foreign leaders around the world.”).
28
HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 212–13 (2003).
29
Id. at 212 (stating that, “coercive acts . . . must not be executed on the territory of another
state without the latter’s consent. Without such consent they constitute a violation of international
law.”).
30
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 27, at 37–44 (arguing that the “international
discord that has erupted, and the potential for conflict with foreign laws, confirm that the warrant
entails an impermissible extraterritorial application of the [Stored Communications Act, a portion
of ECPA].”).
31
See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L. REV. 317, 336
(2015) (discussing how a sovereignty-based model of internet governance “would be legally
simple, but so far, it is not descriptively accurate. States appear generally unable to secure their
cyber borders like they secure their physical territory. There is basically one global Internet, not
individual national internets. Imposing a sovereignty-based model for cyberspace would thus mark
a major change from the status quo and would fundamentally after the domain being governed.”);
Internet Invariants: What Really Matters, INTERNET SOC. (Feb. 3, 2012),
https://www.internetsociety.org/internet-invariants-what-really-matters/; Reisman, supra note 24.
32
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 365–78 (2015);
Reisman, supra note 24.
33
Daskal, supra note 32; Fraser, supra note 24, at 362–68.
34
Reisman, supra note 24.
35
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 27, at 37–44.

2019

HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE REFORM

63

warrant in a place outside the United States.”36 The resulting court
challenge drew attention to the fact that Microsoft—like other private
companies—is routinely forced to be the arbiter of fundamental principles
of international law, conflicts of law concerning fundamental rights, and
strong political pressure.37 Given that Microsoft is a private company, this
is not ideal.
Thus, there is a pressing need for MLAT reform. Yet most proposals
are problematic, because they streamline access by weakening legal
safeguards against abuse.

II. MLAT REFORM IS NEVERTHELESS CONCERNING

Despite the need for MLAT reform, most proposals are concerning
because they accelerate data access by eliminating or paring down
procedural protections for online privacy, data protection, and other
fundamental rights. The resulting legal frameworks may be inconsistent
with states’ obligations under international human rights law and increase
the risk of abuses.
A. STATES’ INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER DATA ACCESS
Longstanding principles governing the right to privacy, combined with
emerging standards applicable to contemporary electronic privacy and data
protection, limit government discretion to collect personal data for law
enforcement purposes.38 Government interference with privacy or data
protection rights must, first, be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.39
Second, the interference must be proportionate to that aim, in that it
appropriately balances the state’s interest in obtaining data with the
seriousness of the interference with the subject’s privacy and data
protection rights.40 Third, the interference must be in accordance with the
law, meaning it has a basis in domestic law that is both compatible with the
rule of law generally and is also sufficiently detailed for its consequences
to be foreseeable.41
Fourth, the interference must be accompanied by adequate safeguards
to prevent arbitrary or abusive practices.42 Legal instruments governing
data collection and other surveillance methods must describe the nature of
offenses that may justify surveillance; define the categories of people who
may be surveilled; limit the duration of surveillance; and describe

36

Id. at 33.
Id.
38
See generally Case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia (Application no. 47143/06), HUDOC
(2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159324 [hereinafter Zakharov v. Russia]; Joined cases
C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t
v. Watson, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 970, at ¶¶ 94–96, 103–12 (Dec. 21, 2016); Human
Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014)
[hereinafter The Right to Privacy]; Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age: Advance Edited Version, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/1 (Aug. 3, 2018) [hereinafter The Right to
Privacy: Advanced].
39
See The Right to Privacy: Advanced, supra note 38.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 231.
37
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procedures for examining, using, and storing data obtained, precautions for
sharing data with other parties, and the circumstances in which data must
or may be destroyed. 43
Fifth, the interference must be subject to adequate oversight. 44
Oversight may take place before, during, or after data collection.45 It must
be effective.46 For example, oversight authorities must have access to all
relevant information and have the power to terminate breaches of
applicable rules.47 It must also be continuous, subject to public scrutiny,
and not give rise to conflicts of interest.48 Conflicts of interest are
especially likely to arise where there is an inadequate separation of powers;
for example, when prosecutors are tasked with both authorizing
surveillance and prosecuting cases based on this evidence.49
Ideally, oversight includes prior merits-based judicial authorization. In
comparison to the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary is bestpositioned to provide independent, impartial, and procedurally proper
decisions about the necessity and proportionality of interferences with
fundamental rights.50 According to the Council of Europe’s Venice
Commission, as quoted by the European Court of Human Rights,
there is an obvious advantage of requiring prior judicial
authorization for special investigative techniques, namely that
the security agency has to go ‘outside of itself’ and convince
an independent person of the need for a particular measure. It
subordinates security concerns to the law, and as such it
serves to institutionalize respect for the law. If it works
properly, judicial authorization will have a preventive effect,
deterring unmeritorious applications and/or cutting down the
duration of a special investigative measure.51
Additionally, an authorizing body must verify that there is a sufficient
factual showing to support a “reasonable suspicion” against the target to
justify surveillance.52 Bodies in other branches of government may be
43

The Right to Privacy, supra note 38, at ¶ 28.
Id.; The Right to Privacy: Advanced, supra note 38; Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at
¶¶ 233–34.
45
Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 233
46
Id. at ¶¶ 275, 281–82.
47
Id. at ¶ 282.
48
Id. at ¶¶ 230, 275, 281–83.
49
Id. at ¶ 230.
50
Id. at ¶¶ 233, 257, 275; Case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary (Application no. 37138/14),
HUDOC
at
¶
79
(2016),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
{"fulltext":["vissy"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["
001-160020"]} (stating: “[i]t is in this context that the external, preferably judicial, a posteriori
control of secret surveillance activities, both in individual cases and as general supervision, gains
its true importance.” (citation omitted)) [hereinafter Case of Szabó and Vissy ]; Joseph A.
Cannataci (U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy), Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Privacy, at ¶¶ 25–26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60 (Feb. 24, 2017) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/34/60].
51
Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶ 21.
52
Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 260 (“Turning now to the authorisation [sic]
authority’s scope of review, the Court reiterates that it must be capable of verifying the existence
of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, whether there are factual
indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts
or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance measures, such as, for example, acts
endangering national security.”); Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶ 71 (“There is no
legal safeguard requiring [the law enforcement agency] to produce supportive materials or, in
44
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tasked with oversight responsibilities, provided they are sufficiently
independent from the executive branch.53
Sixth, the interference must be accompanied by a remedy.54 The
remedy must be effective. It must not merely take the form of empty words
that leave individuals powerless to seek redress and curb government
abuse.55
It is important to note that the overall aim of these standards is to limit
government discretion. Because of its secrecy and lack of transparency,
government surveillance is especially prone to abuse.56 The abuse of
surveillance powers not only threatens the rights of individuals, but can
also result in political control and the erosion of democracy.57 Therefore, it
would be “contrary to the rule of law for the discretion granted . . . to be
expressed in terms of an unfettered power.”58 By limiting government
discretion, these protections reduce the risk of arbitrary interference and
abuse.59 It follows that legal protections that are worded ambiguously,
provide toothless oversight powers, or in any other way leave government
discretion excessive in practice—regardless of what is written down on
paper—fail to satisfy a state’s obligations under international human rights
law.
B. HOW THE U.S. MLA PROCESSES PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS
The current U.S. MLA process affords subjects of data collection
effective legal protections. It entails prior merits-based judicial
authorization that is conditioned upon sufficient factual support.60 Just as
the European Court of Human Rights requires “a reasonable suspicion”
against an individual, supported by “factual indications for suspecting that
person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts,” a U.S.
court requires probable cause or “specific and articulable facts showing
particular, a sufficient factual basis for the application of secret intelligence gathering measures
which would enable the evaluation of necessity of the proposed measure - and this on the basis of
an individual suspicion regarding the target person. For the Court, only such information would
allow the authorising [sic] authority to perform an appropriate proportionality test.” (citations
omitted)); Joined cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Sec’y
of State for Home Dep’t v. Watson, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 970, at ¶¶ 103–07, 112 (Dec.
21, 2016).
53
See, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 275; Weber v. Germany, App. No.
54934/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006) (describing a sufficiently independent non-judicial oversight
process).
54
See Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 220.
55
See, e.g., id. at ¶ 298 (finding a remedy insufficient because it relied on knowledge of
surveillance, despite a lack of mandatory notification).
56
Id. at ¶ 230.
57
See, e.g., China has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State Like No Other, ECONOMIST (May
31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-into-apolice-state-like-no-other (“A system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), first
revealed by Human Rights Watch, uses machine-learning systems, information from cameras,
smartphones, financial and family-planning records and even unusual electricity use to generate
lists of suspects for detention. One official WeChat report said that verifying IJOP’s lists was one
of the main responsibilities of the local security committee. Even without high-tech surveillance,
Xinjiang’s police state is formidable. With it, it becomes terrifying . . . Islam is a special target.”).
58
Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 230.
59
Id.
60
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (a court order will not be issued without
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (a warrant
requires probable cause and the identification of the person or property to be searched).
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that there are reasonable grounds to believe” information sought is relevant
to a crime.61 An additional layer of independent oversight is provided by
OIA’s approval of incoming requests and outgoing responses.62
If the loss of these protections in new legal instruments is not balanced
with alternative protections, much of the world’s population may be left
vulnerable to arbitrary and abusive data collection practices by domestic
law enforcement agencies.
C. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THESE LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE ABSENT
Far from being a hypothetical concern, both history and contemporary
events show that the absence of legal restrictions on government access to
data when that data is technically easily obtainable, quickly results in
abuses of power, human rights violations, and political control. The
Chinese government, for example, uses predictive policing methods, fueled
by “big data,” to continuously monitor members of an ethnic minority
group and deter dissent, ostensibly for national security purposes.63
Hundreds of thousands of members of this group have been funneled into
“concentrated transformation-through-education center[s].”64

III. RECENT LEGISLATION AND PROPOSALS

Recently proposed or enacted legal instruments designed to streamline
cross-border data access include the U.S. CLOUD Act, the EU’s eEvidence proposal, the Council of Europe’s potential Second Additional
Protocol to the Budapest Convention, and a proposal for an International
Data Access Warrant by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to
privacy. Only the CLOUD Act has been enacted.
A. CLOUD ACT:
The CLOUD Act enables both the U.S. government and foreign
governments to access data controlled by U.S. companies more easily.
First, U.S. law enforcement agencies may compel production of data,
regardless of where the data are stored.65 Second, the legislation lifts

61
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 260 (discussing the need for
reasonable suspicion).
62
LIN & FIDLER, supra note 8, at 2–3.
63
Human Rights Watch, China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region (Feb. 26,
2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region;
Human Rights Watch, China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent (Nov.
19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-data-systems-violate-privacytarget-dissentl.
64
Chris Buckley, China Is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal: ‘Transformation,’
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighurmuslim-detention-camp.html (“In addition to the mass detentions, the authorities have intensified
the use of informers and expanded police surveillance, even installing cameras in some people’s
homes. Human rights activists and experts say the campaign has traumatized Uighur society,
leaving behind fractured communities and families. ‘Penetration of everyday life is almost really
total now.’”).
65
18 U.S.C. § 2713 (2018) (“A provider . . . shall comply . . . regardless of whether such
communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.”).
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restrictions on U.S. company compliance with direct foreign requests made
outside of the MLA process, when the foreign government is a party to an
executive agreement made pursuant to the CLOUD Act.66 A state’s
eligibility for an agreement is determined by the U.S. Attorney General’s
assessment of the state’s legal system.
1. Speed and Efficiency
The CLOUD Act is designed to increase the speed and efficiency of
cross-border data access for both the U.S. government and selected foreign
governments. The legislation eliminates OIA and U.S. judicial approval
requirements for states party to executive agreements made pursuant to the
Act.67 It creates reciprocal rights, under which the U.S. government may
demand data stored anywhere when controlled by companies under U.S.
jurisdiction.68 This will presumably reduce wait-times from months to
days.69 In addition, this would reduce the OIA’s workload, benefitting all
states that request data through the U.S. MLA process.
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality
While the CLOUD Act prevents jurisdictional conflicts and violations
of state sovereignty between the U.S. and parties to executive agreements,
it does not necessarily do so for other countries.
The CLOUD Act reduces the risk of violations of state sovereignty
between the U.S. and states parties to executive agreements in two ways.
First, it creates reciprocal rights of access that remove barriers to direct
cooperation between law enforcement agencies in one state and service
providers in another.70 Second, a service provider may file a motion to
quash or modify a U.S. demand if compliance would violate the law of a
state party to a CLOUD Act agreement.71 When assessing this motion, a
court will engage in a comity analysis, which balances the interests of the
U.S. government and foreign governments.72
However, the interests of countries not party to an executive
agreement are inadequately addressed. Given that data is stored all over the
world, it is also likely to be stored in states not party to these agreements.73
The CLOUD Act does not enable a company to file a motion to modify or
quash a U.S. order or warrant due to a conflict of law with a state not party
to an executive agreement.74
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18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5) (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5).
68
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(I); 18 U.S.C. § 2713.
69
Infra Part II, Section (A).
70
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(I).
71
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2).
72
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(3); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2078 (2015) (defining international comity as “deference to foreign
government actors that is not required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law,”
which is in part a presumption against extraterritoriality).
73
Reisman, supra note 24.
74
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (stating that motions to quash or modify may be filed where “the
required disclosure would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a
qualifying foreign government”); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(1)(A)(i) (defining a qualifying foreign
government as one “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has entered into
force under section 2523”).
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3. Human Rights
The CLOUD Act promotes human rights protections by conditioning
executive agreements on the satisfaction of minimum standards in
domestic law and by imposing certain requirements in the terms of
agreements and requests made pursuant to these agreements. Though the
legislation’s long list of conditions and requirements may at first glance
seem impressive, upon greater scrutiny, most are meaningless.
i. Protections in Domestic Law
The legislation enumerates “factors” the Attorney General must
consider when determining whether a potential state party provides
sufficiently strong substantive and procedural protections in the context of
data collection to qualify for an agreement.75 Most of these factors are
worded ambiguously, effectively making them optional.
The first factor is whether the state is party to the Budapest
Convention.76 Yet this treaty merely reiterates states parties’ obligations
under general-purpose human rights treaties, and lacks specific protections
applicable to cross-border data access.77
Second, the state must “demonstrate[] respect for the rule of law and
principles of nondiscrimination.”78 Neither the “rule of law” nor the
“principle of nondiscrimination” is defined in the CLOUD Act. This is
problematic because they are broad terms that can be interpreted in a
multitude of ways, some of which are merely formalistic and do not
constrain government power in practice.79
Third, a state must “adher[e] to applicable international human rights
obligations and commitments or demonstrat[e] respect for international
universal human rights” with respect to privacy, “the freedom[s] of
expression, association, and [] assembly,” “prohibitions on arbitrary
arrest,” “torture, and cruel, inhumane, or degrading” punishment.80
Yet these international legal obligations are not completely settled. So,
without further clarification, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
make this determination objectively. Applicable treaty language is vague
about online privacy and personal data.81 Jurists and legal scholars are only
just beginning to interpret privacy rights for the digital age.82 Additionally,
75

18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B).
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(i).
77
Zahid Jamil, The Budapest Convention: Investigative Powers & Article 15, COUNCIL EUR.
(Aug. 11, 2014), https://rm.coe.int/16803028b2.
78
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(ii).
79
See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY, 92–
93, 96 (2004) (discussing “rule by law,” a concept that guides the Chinese government, as well as
the “emptiness of formal legality . . . [which] runs contrary to the long tradition of the rule of law,
the historical inspiration of which has been the restraint of tyranny by the sovereign. Such restraint
went beyond the idea that the government must enact and abide by laws that take on the proper
form of rules, to include the understanding that there were certain things the government or
sovereign could not do . . . Formal legality discards this orientation. Consistent with formal
legality, the government can do as it wishes, so long as it is able to pursue those desires in terms
consistent with (general, clear, certain, and public) legal rules declared in advance.”).
80
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii).
81
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 92 U.S.T. 908, 999 U.N.T.S. 17; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, art. 7, 8, 2000 O.J. (C364) 1 (2000).
82
Most relevant case law and international organization publications postdate 2013. See, e.g.,
Eur. Ct. H.R., Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to Respect
76

2019

HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE REFORM

69

state practice varies immensely, even between likeminded western
democracies, demonstrating that there is insufficient global uniformity to
establish customary law.83
Moreover, the phrase “adheres to applicable international human rights
obligations and commitments or demonstrates respect for international
universal human rights” implies that a state could fail to satisfy its legal
obligations, but nonetheless be certified as a result of an empty gesture.84
The remaining factors are only somewhat more concrete. A potential
state party must have “clear legal mandates and procedures” authorizing
law enforcement data collection, as well as “sufficient” accountability
mechanisms and an “appropriate” amount of transparency for this
activity.85 While it is important to determine that a legal basis for this
activity exists, the legislation says nothing about the acceptable amount of
discretion these mandates and procedures afford foreign law enforcement
agencies. What kind of oversight is “sufficient”? What level of
transparency is “appropriate”?
Finally, a potential state party must “demonstrate a commitment” to
promote and protect Internet openness and the free flow of information.86
Presumably this provision is intended to discourage data localization, one
of the perceived benefits of the legislation, but this language does not
prohibit the practice outright.87
ii. Terms of the Agreements
The CLOUD Act states that an agreement made pursuant to the
legislation “shall not create any obligation that providers be capable of
decryption data or limitation that prevents providers from decrypting
data.”88 Mandated decryption capabilities, or encryption backdoors,
for Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence 92–97 (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf; Joseph A. Cannataci (U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the right to privacy), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/64 (Nov. 24, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/64]; Frank La Rue
(U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013).
83
Compare Ieuan Jolly et. al., Data Protection in the United States: Overview,
THOMSON
R EUTERS
PRAC .
L.
(July
1,
2017),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/Ful
lText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 , with
European
Commission,
Data
Protection
in
the
EU
(May
6,
2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en.
84
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii). Empty gestures in international human rights law abound.
See, e.g., Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations
Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (Apr. 10, 2006) (enumerating the states parties to CEDAW that
have made reservations to Article 2, which effectively nullifies all other CEDAW obligations);
International Law Association, International Law Association Report on the Treaty System (1996),
http://www.bayefsky.com/reform/ila.php (“For a great many states ratification has become an end
in itself, a means to easy accolades for empty gestures . . . [R]atification by human rights
adversaries is purchased at a price, namely, diminished obligations, lax supervision, and few
adverse consequences from non-compliance.”).
85
18 U.S.C. §§ 2523(b)(1)(B)(iv)–(v).
86
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(vi).
87
See, e.g., Andrew K. Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative Fix
for Cross-Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cloudact-welcome-legislative-fix-cross-border-data-problems; contra Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2018, ch. 119, sec, 105, § 2253(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018) (the
ambiguous language of the CLOUD Act with the specific language of the draft legal instrument).
88
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(3).
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threaten human rights; in particular the right to hold an opinion, access to
information, and freedom of expression.89 While this language limits one
avenue for the creation of encryption backdoors, it wastes an opportunity
to prohibit them outright.
iii. Requirements for Individual Orders
Requirements for individual orders are designed to limit government
discretion, and include purpose limitation, targeting requirements, and
rules for sharing and oversight.
a. Purpose Limitation
The CLOUD Act limits the purposes for which orders can be sent by
foreign governments to “serious crime[s], including terrorism,” which may
not include infringements on the freedom of speech.90 Yet the term
“serious crime” is undefined, and absent further clarification may be
interpreted too liberally.91
b. Proportionality
The most concrete and stringent legal protections replicate existing
U.S. judicial standards. The subject of a data request must be described by
“a specific person, account, address, or personal device, or any other
specific identifier.”92 Additionally, a request must include “a reasonable
justification based on articulable and credible facts, particularity, legality,
and the severity regarding the conduct under investigation.”93 These
requirements mirror emerging human rights standards, according to which
surveillance is permissible only where reasonable and individualized
suspicion exists.94 This narrow targeting helps to prevent disproportionate,
indiscriminate data collection.95
c. Safeguards for Sharing
Importantly, the legislation limits intergovernmental sharing practices
that allow governments to circumvent domestic legal protections. First, an
individual order cannot be served for the purpose of providing data to the
U.S. government or a third country’s government.96 Second, the foreign
government “may not” share content with the U.S. government, unless it
89
See generally David Kaye (U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32
(May 22, 2015).
90
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(E).
91
See, e.g., Rebecca Hill, UK.gov Agrees to Narrow ‘Serious Crime’ Definition for Slurping
Comms
Data,
REGISTER
(July
11,
2018),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/07/11/ukgov_agrees_to_narrow_serious_crime_definition_for
_sucking_up_comms_data/ (describing how the U.K. government recently increased the minimum
imprisonment threshold for a serious crime from six months—which encompasses minor crimes,
such as shoplifting—to twelve months, for the purposes of surveillance authorization).
92
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(ii).
93
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(iv).
94
See Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶ 71.
95
See e.g., id.
96
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(C).
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relates to a severe offense, such as terrorism or “significant violent
crime.”97 If the U.S. government does receive this information, it must
apply minimization procedures derived from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.98 These rules partially address the loopholes created by
arrangements, such as “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing, in which the U.S.
and several partner states reciprocally share information obtained through
foreign intelligence operations, which allows each state to systematically
circumvent stronger domestic legal safeguards on data collection.99
However, these provisions leave open the possibility that a state party
could collect large amounts of information on behalf of other countries and
share it voluntarily with the implicit understanding that this will be
reciprocated. Only the sharing of content with U.S. authorities is restricted,
and there is no restriction on sharing information with third countries in the
legislation.100 Yet, as others have discussed in depth, metadata, including
subscriber information, is just as revealing content.101 In practice, these
rules will do little to prevent “Five Eyes”-style data sharing arrangements.
iv. Oversight
a. Domestic Oversight
The legislation requires some form of domestic independent oversight
in which each order is reviewable.102 Yet it provides no additional criteria.
The language—“review or oversight” by the judiciary “or other
independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding, enforcement of
the order”—could encompass anything from prior merits-based judicial
approval to a merely nominally independent review body that acts as a
rubber stamp.103 If no provisions require meaningful oversight or approval
by the judicial or legislative branch, the executive branches could be left to
police itself, increasing the risk of abuse.104
b. U.S. Oversight
Some degree of U.S. oversight is envisioned, though—once again—
the imprecise wording could produce anything from systematic oversight
to spotty rubber-stamping. The U.S. government may “render the
agreement inapplicable” for requests that do not meet the agreement’s
requirements.105 In other words, if a foreign request is insufficiently
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18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(H).
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(G)–(H).
99
See, e.g., Alex Sinha, British Spying is Our Problem, Too, AM. C.L. UNION BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/british-spying-our-problem-too?redirect=blog/nationalsecurity/british-spying-our-problem-too (“The United States has extensive intelligence-sharing arrangements
with key allies like the U.K., and through them has access to information that it can’t legally collect on its
own. Sharing flows both ways, so the U.K. also has unfettered access to much ‘raw’ or unfiltered U.S.
surveillance data.”).
100
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(H).
101
See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60, supra note 50, at ¶ 25 (arguing that metadata “are at
least as revealing of a person’s individual activity as the actual content of a conversation”).
102
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(v).
103
Id.; 18 U.S.C §§ 1804–05 (2010) (describing the perfunctory approval process for
surveillance under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments
Act of 2008).
104
See, e.g., Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶¶ 75, 77.
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18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(K).
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targeted, or the U.S. government does not consider the relevant offense
serious, then—for that particular request—the state party would be forced
to obtain the information through the normal MLA process or some other
method. It is unclear how an improperly invoked order would be detected
be the U.S. government, as these agreements would be designed to largely
eliminate U.S. government involvement, and the CLOUD Act provides
only limited grounds for a company to challenge a foreign request.106
Additionally, the state party must agree to “periodic review of
compliance” by the U.S. government.107 The period between reviews is not
specified. Would it be monthly, yearly, or perhaps every five years? Would
it be effective, enabling American reviewers to access all relevant
documents and act to stop abuses?108
Outside of the executive branch, only a joint resolution by Congress
can block an executive agreement, if it is insufficiently protective of
human rights.109 No judicial challenges are permitted for the certification
of a state.110
v. Political Considerations
Given the flexibility of this language, whether it adequately protects
human rights depends almost entirely on how permissively it is interpreted
by the Attorney General. Considering the current Attorney General’s
record on human rights issues, and his apparent lack of legal expertise in
online privacy and data protection issues, this does not inspire
confidence.111
B. E-EVIDENCE PROPOSAL
Legislation proposed by the European Commission would permit a
judicial or investigative authority to compel the production of electronic
evidence for criminal investigations from service provider representatives
in the EU, regardless of where the data is stored. The e-Evidence proposal
includes a draft directive that would require any service provider “offering
services” in the EU to provide a legal representative physically located in
the EU to receive data production and preservation orders.112 These orders,
called the European Production Order and the European Preservation
Order, would be issued pursuant to the second half of the proposal, a draft
regulation.113 Upon receipt, the representative would be required to
preserve or produce sought-after electronic evidence in the service
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18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(J).
108
See Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 281, 282 (discussing elements of oversight
effectiveness).
109
18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4).
110
18 U.S.C. § 2523(c).
111
See, e.g., Jeff Sessions Issues Directive Undercutting LGBT Protections, GUARDIAN (Oct.
6,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/06/jeff-sessions-issues-directiveundercutting-lgbtq-protections; Vann R. Newkirk II, The End of Civil Rights, ATLANTIC (June 18,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/sessions/563006/.
112
Draft Directive, supra note 2, at art. 2(1)–(3), 3 (The definition of “offering services”
encompasses major U.S. tech companies, as they “enable[e] legal or natural persons in a Member
State to use the services” and “hav[e] a substantial connection to the Member State.”).
113
Id. at 5 n.12.
107

2019

HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE REFORM

73

provider’s control.114 Like the CLOUD Act, by rendering the location of
data irrelevant, these orders would allow law enforcement authorities in
member states to circumvent existing MLAT proceedings.
1. Speed and Efficiency
Generally, a company will have a ten-day time limit for compliance.115
The time limit is reduced to six hours in emergency cases.116 This is, of
course, a dramatically shorter period of time than the months-long wait
time member states often face when seeking data through the MLA
process.117
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality
The draft regulation envisions procedures similar to a CLOUD Act
comity analysis for potential conflicts of law. If a service provider fears
that compliance with a production order will violate the law of a third
country, meaning a country outside of the EU, it can send a reasoned
objection to the law enforcement agency that issued the order.118 The
agency must then request a review by a court in its state if it wishes to
pursue the order.119 That court must determine whether the third country’s
law prohibits disclosure.120 If it finds no conflict, it will order the company
to comply.121 If the court identifies a conflict, and the relevant area of law
concerns fundamental rights, national security, or defense, it will leave the
decision with the “central authorities” of the affected third country.122 If
the conflict relates to a different area of law, the court in the member state
will make the decision alone, according to what is more-or-less a comity
analysis, while also taking into account the interests of the company.123
Like the U.S. comity analysis, this process would greatly reduce the
chance that a third country’s territorial sovereignty would be violated, but
would not be absolutely preclusive. When evaluating a potential conflict of
law arising from something other than fundamental rights, national
security, or defense, a member state court would consider “the interest
protected by the relevant law of the third country” as one of several
factors, and the physical presence of the data in the third state would not be
an outright bar to enforcement of the production order.124
3. Human Rights
The EU’s broader legal context—including both EU law and the
overlapping European Convention on Human Rights—combined with
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Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 9, 10.
Id. at art. 9(1).
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Id. at art. 9(2).
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Infra Part II, Section (A).
118
Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 15, 16.
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Id.
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Id. at art.15(5)–(7).
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Id. at art.16(5)–(6).
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requirements in the draft regulation, could render the loss of U.S.
procedural protections largely irrelevant.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to privacy
and personal data protection.125 These rights are further clarified in case
law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which,
among other things, prohibits indiscriminate data collection by
governments, and mirrors the “necessary and proportionate” framework
found in international legal materials.126 More specific legislation
constrains law enforcement data collection and other surveillance
methods.127 Additionally, all EU member states are party to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which provides similar protections.128
The draft regulation specifies its own legal protections. Similar to the
U.S. MLA process, it requires prior or subsequent judicial validation for
access to content. Unlike U.S. law, it would further require judicial
involvement for access to “transactional data,” a form of non-content
data.129 Orders would be conditioned upon necessity and proportionality. 130
Additionally, member states would provide an “effective” judicial remedy
for people whose data were obtained using a production order.131
Importantly, both suspects and non-suspects would have access to this
remedy.132 An individual would have the opportunity to challenge the
necessity, proportionality, or legality of the order.133
Nevertheless, domestic practices can, at least in the short term,
undermine regional human rights legal protections.134 This highlights the

125
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7, 8(1), 2000 O.J. (C364) 1
(2000) (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and
communications . . . Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or
her.”).
126
Joined cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Sec’y of
State for Home Dep’t v. Watson, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 970, at ¶¶ 94–96, 103 (Dec. 21,
2016); Case C-362/14. Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of the Court (Grand
Chamber) (E.C.J. 2015) (“[L]egislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a
generalised [sic] basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by
Article 7 of the Charter . . . Likewise, legislation not providing for any possibility for an individual
to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the
rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to
effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.”); see also Joined cases C293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, at 45–54,
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) (E.C.J. 2014) (“Article 52(1) of the Charter provides that
any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms laid down by the Charter must be
provided for by law, respect their essence and, subject to the principle of proportionality,
limitations may be made to those rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely
meet objectives of general interest recognised [sic] by the Union or the need to protect the rights
and freedoms of others.”).
127
See, e.g., Council Directive 2016/680, art. 4–11, 53–54, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89 (EU);
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 48, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
128
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see also, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at
¶ 231; Case of Szabó & Vissy, supra note 50.
129
Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(2).
130
Id. at art. 5.
131
Id. at art. 17(3) (“Such right to an effective remedy shall be exercised before a court in the
issuing State in accordance with its national law and shall include the possibility to challenge the
legality of the measure, including its necessity and proportionality.”).
132
Id. at art. 17(1)–(2).
133
Id. at art. 17(3).
134
See, e.g., Privacy International, Liberty, and Open Rights Group Joined Other
Organisations Across the EU to File Complaints Over Member States’ Non-Compliance with
Mass Surveillance Rulings, PRIVACY INT’L, (June 25, 2018),
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practical value of an external check on potential abuses of domestic law
enforcement powers.
Therefore, despite the robust legal framework provided by the EU and
ECHR, the loss of U.S. protections could leave the citizens of at least some
EU member states subject to indiscriminate data collection by domestic
law enforcement.
C. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE BUDAPEST CONVENTION
The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention Committee is
currently drafting a Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest
Convention, with the intention of streamlining access to cross-border
electronic evidence.135 The Budapest Convention requires states parties,
which include the U.S. and other non-Council of Europe countries, to both
cooperate in MLA requests and maintain certain capabilities for collecting
electronic evidence to facilitate this process.136 The protocol would address
contemporary challenges associated with “cloud-based” evidence, which
can be stored in different jurisdictions.137
Although the final form of the proposal has not yet been published,
some details about the drafters’ intentions appear in preparatory
documents. First, the protocol will likely require state parties to permit
service providers in their jurisdictions to disclose subscriber information to
law enforcement authorities in other state parties “voluntarily,” meaning
without a domestic warrant obtained through an MLA process.138 This
would partially replicate the exception in the ECPA that permits U.S.
service providers to comply with direct requests for non-content data from
foreign governments.139 Second, it will likely create international
production and preservation orders, mirroring the e-Evidence proposal.140
Third, it will possibly contain additional human rights safeguards to
accompany these newly created powers. Fourth, the protocol will likely
clarify the restrictions on unilateral measures issued to circumvent the
MLA process.141
1. Speed and Efficiency
Hypothetically, voluntary disclosure regimes and mandatory
production orders would reduce waiting periods for access to cross-border
data. Given that subscriber data is the most sought type of data in law
enforcement investigations, a voluntary disclosure scheme would greatly
https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/2119/privacy-international-liberty-and-openrights-group-joined-other-organisations [hereinafter Privacy International].
135
Terms of Reference, supra note 2; see also Discussion Guide for Consultations with Civil
Society, Data Protection Authorities and Industry, CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, (May
21, 2018), https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-2018-16-pdp-consultations-paper/16808add27 [hereinafter
Discussion Guide]. For those unfamiliar with the difference between the EU and Council of
Europe
institutions,
see
Do
Not
Get
Confused,
COUNCIL
EUROPE,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused (last accessed Apr. 20, 2019).
136
Budapest Convention, supra note 2, at art. 14, 29–34.
137
Terms of Reference, supra note 2, at 3.
138
Budapest Convention, supra note 2, at art. 18 (defining subscriber information as noncontent information pertaining to a user’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone or other
access number, and billing or payment information); Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 5–6.
139
Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 5–6.
140
Id. at 7.
141
Terms of Reference, supra note 2, at 34; Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 3.
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help to alleviate the overall burden of the existing MLA regime.142
Currently, most state parties to the Convention do not permit this kind of
direct cooperation with foreign law enforcement requests.143
Additionally, an international production order modeled after the
European Production Order would presumably reduce waiting periods, as
it would likely eliminate foreign MLA proceedings for law enforcement
agencies.144 A mandatory production order, like the proposed European
Production Order, would prevent situations in which a service provider
chooses not to comply with a discretionary request.145
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality
By coupling mandatory production orders with voluntary disclosure
regimes, the Protocol would reduce the likelihood of friction between
states concerning jurisdiction over data. Assuming the Protocol would
require reciprocal rights for state parties—this prior consent would prevent
violations of state sovereignty between state parties.146 Furthermore, the
voluntary disclosure scheme would help to prevent conflicts from arising
by preventing the use of coercive legal methods or the need for approval
by foreign governments.147
3. Human Rights
Few details have been provided about the Protocol’s potential human
rights protections. However, given how little print space has been devoted
to the topic thus far, it may wind up being an afterthought.148 This would
not be surprising, given that the same could be said about the Budapest
Convention, which merely reiterates governments’ obligations under
general-purpose human rights treaties.149
This presents a problem because there is substantial variation in the
domestic legal protections afforded by parties to the Budapest Convention
to people whose data are sought in law enforcement investigations. While
most parties are members of both the Council of Europe and the EU,
whose legal frameworks, at least hypothetically, provide robust baseline
human rights protections, some state parties provide far weaker or
qualitatively different protections. For example, recently enacted data
protection legislation in Turkey provides few checks on government abuse
of data collection powers.150
Nationals of these countries would suffer a loss of U.S. procedural
protections for content and easier access to subscriber information in other
countries. Mandatory production orders would deprive non-U.S. persons
the external check currently provided by the U.S. MLA process on the
142

T-CY Assessment Report, supra note 4, at 123.
Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 5.
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See infra Part IV, Section (B)(1); Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 7.
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See infra Part II, Section (C).
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Craig Shaw & Zeynep Sentek, ‘Citizens Will Be Stripped Naked’ by Turkey’s Data Law,
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abuse of data collection powers by domestic law enforcement agencies; at
least with regard to content. Additionally, while the U.S. already permits
companies to voluntarily disclose subscriber information, this is
problematic, and the expansion of this practice would be even more so.
Ready availability of subscriber information undermines online anonymity,
which is crucial for the protection of human rights in the digital age.151
D. INTERNATIONAL DATA ACCESS WARRANT
These differences in domestic human rights protections would be
rendered largely irrelevant in the draft legal instrument under consideration
by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy.152 As a potential
international treaty, it would impose common standards and rules
pertaining to cross-border data access derived from international human
rights law and would also transfer authorization power from domestic
authorities to an international body.
As it now stands, the draft legal instrument would create an alternative
to the MLA process through the creation of an international judicial body
empowered to issue International Data Access Warrants.153 A domestic
law enforcement agency or investigator could send an application directly
to this judicial body, which could then issue a warrant to a service provider
located in any other state party.154
1. Speed and Efficiency
Though no maximum response time is specified, the scheme
envisioned in the draft legal instrument would increase the speed and
efficiency of the data access process through remote deliberations,
adequate resourcing, twenty-four hour scheduling, and more generally,
providing a streamlined procedure.155 State parties would be required to
provide “adequate resources for the efficient working” of the bodies
created by the instrument, which would help to prevent OIA-style
backlogs.156 Wherever possible, proceedings would be carried out
online.157 Empirical evidence shows that online dispute resolution tools,
including remote video testimony, reduce the length and cost of judicial
proceedings.158 This “one-stop shop” would eliminate the need for lengthy
and complex approval processes in U.S. courts and central authorities.159
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See generally Kaye, supra note 89.
Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Privacy at ¶¶ 114, 127, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/62 (Feb. 28, 2018) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/37/62].
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Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2, at art. 15.
154
Id. at art. 4(1)(j), 15(2)(b)(ii).
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Id. at art. 15(4)–(5) (any state failing to make its required contributions would be
suspended).
157
Id. at art. 15(3)(a).
158
Id. at art. 15(4).
159
Id. at art 15 cmt. 1297.
152

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

78

vol. 9:2

2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality
At least among parties to the not-yet-proposed instrument, this design
would prevent violations of state sovereignty and reduce the risk of
international discord. Service providers in state parties would be required
to comply with International Data Access Warrants and could not justify
noncompliance on the basis of jurisdiction or territoriality.160 A state could
not circumvent the international warrant process via unilateral measures,
absent another form of prior consent from the affected state.161
Importantly, this draft instrument could take the form of an
international treaty, potentially open to all U.N. member states.162 The
resulting universal or near-universal consent could effectively render
uncertainty about jurisdiction irrelevant.
3. Human Rights
Unsurprisingly, the draft legal instrument features a robust human
rights framework, consisting of multilayered independent oversight,
including prior judicial authorization, and stringent domestic legal
protections.
i. Oversight
a. Prior Judicial Authorization
An international judicial body established by the draft legal instrument
would approve or reject applications from domestic law enforcement
agencies for International Data Access Warrants.163 This body would be
comprised of a lower-level body called the International Data Access
Commission and an appellate-level body called the International Data
Access Tribunal.164 Each application for data access would be assessed by
a panel of three judges in the Commission, and, if appealed, by five judges
in the Tribunal.165
The independence of decision-making would be guaranteed not only
by the involvement of judges, but also by the insulation of judges from
domestic political pressure. Though judges would be nominated by state
parties, they would be remunerated by an independent body established by
the draft legal instrument.166 Decisions would be based on simple majority
votes by panels randomly selected through automation, with only one seat
reserved for a judge nominated by the applicant state.167 It would be highly
unlikely that one state’s executive branch could effectively influence the
outcome of a decision through political pressure.168
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b. Systematic Oversight
More general oversight would be carried out by two committees. A
committee of human rights legal experts called the Committee of Human
Rights Defenders would produce an annual report, including the number of
cases monitored, difficulties encountered in the course of this work, and
recommendations for best practices.169 A second consultative committee
would monitor all procedures undertaken pursuant to the legal instrument
and make recommendations about the interpretation of, and potential
amendments to, the legal instrument.170
ii. Adversarial Component
In each warrant application process, a Human Rights Defender would
be randomly assigned to monitor the process, and if appropriate, advocate
on behalf of the subject.171 The Human Rights Defender would “have the
right of audience and to present arguments . . . where it is felt that [the]
surveillance requested is unnecessary, disproportionate or in any way
breaches [the subject’s] fundamental human rights.”172
iii. Domestic Legal Requirements
Eligibility for ratification of the draft legal instrument would, in part,
be conditioned upon the adoption of stringent human rights protections in
domestic law for domestic surveillance.173 Among these requirements is
multilayered oversight that includes independent prior authorization, a
sufficiently detailed and publicly accessible legal basis for surveillance,
requirements for necessity, proportionality, and reasonable suspicion, and a
remedy.174
E. COMPARING THE PROPOSALS
Only the draft legal instrument for the International Data Access
Warrant adequately addresses challenges related to speed, jurisdiction, and
human rights.
1. Speed and Efficiency
By eliminating the need for MLA procedures, the CLOUD Act, eEvidence proposal, Budapest Convention, and the draft legal instrument
for an International Data Access Warrant would increase the speed and
efficiency of cross-border data access. The elimination of MLA
proceedings, including domestic and foreign central authority scrutiny, as
well as judicial approval for incoming U.S. requests, would dramatically
simplify the process. Each legal instrument would provide an alternative
169

Id. at art. 15(2)(c).
Id. at art. 15(2)(a) (the committee is tentatively called the “Surveillance Legal Instrument
Consultative Committee”).
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Id. at art. 15(2)(c)(v)(1), 15(2)(c)(iii), 15(2)(c)(v)(2).
172
Id. at art. 15(2)(c)(v)(2); id. at art. 2(1) (Surveillance is defined in the instrument to include
data collection.).
173
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to, or simply eliminate, foreign MLA requirements.175 These streamlined
procedures would likely shave months off of response times, at least in the
U.S.176 The e-Evidence proposal envisions a response time of ten days or
less in non-emergency situations, in contrast to its current wait-time of one
to six months.177
Additionally, the overall reduction of OIA’s caseload would
presumably shrink its backlog and reduce wait-times for states not party to,
or beneficiaries of, these instruments. Caseloads in other states could be
reduced further by the voluntary disclosure regime for subscriber data
envisioned in the forthcoming protocol to the Budapest Convention.178
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality
To varying degrees, these legal instruments would reduce the risk of
violations of state sovereignty and conflicts of law through the removal of
blocking provisions and application of comity analysis.
Executive agreements made pursuant to the CLOUD Act would
eliminate “blocking” provisions in the U.S. and parties to these
agreements, allowing service providers to respond directly to foreign data
requests.179 The uncompleted Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest
Convention would adopt a similar scheme for subscriber data.180
Additionally, pursuant to the CLOUD Act, a service provider may
challenge a U.S. request if it would potentially create a conflict of law with
a party to an executive agreement. In assessing the motion, the court would
perform a comity analysis, which includes a presumption against
extraterritoriality.181 The e-Evidence proposal contains a more inclusive
mechanism to prevent conflicts of law. If a request potentially creates a
conflict of law with any country (not only pre-approved countries), a
service provider may challenge the request.182 Additionally, the
government of the affected country would in certain circumstances have
the opportunity to deny the request.183
While reducing the chance of international discord, the CLOUD Act
and e-Evidence proposal would not entirely prevent violations of state
sovereignty through unapproved cross-border data access. Given service
providers’ dynamic and global data storage practices, situations will
inevitably arise in which a provider is ordered to produce data stored in a
country that has not given consent through a CLOUD Act agreement or
other legal instrument.184 The CLOUD Act’s comity analysis only follows
from potential conflicts with parties to agreements, and the e-Evidence
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Id. at art. 15; 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5) (1988); Draft Regulation,
supra note 2, at art. 1.
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See infra Part II, Section (A).
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proposal’s conflict mechanism—while generous—does not entirely
prevent unapproved access.185
More troubling is the inevitability that this approach—a government
empowering itself to compel data stored in any country through domestic
(or EU) law—will be copied by governments likely to abuse that power.
This could give rise to “a potentially dangerous and uncoordinated race to
the bottom.”186
It follows that violations of state sovereignty and conflicts of law
would occur less frequently where an inclusive multilateral agreement
creates prior consent for direct access by foreign governments, as well as a
degree of legal uniformity among state parties. This is what the draft legal
instrument for an International Data Access Warrant would accomplish.
This legal instrument would impose a set of stringent minimum human
rights standards in government surveillance, and state parties would agree
to require service providers in their jurisdiction to comply with
International Data Access Warrants.187
3. Human Rights
While both the CLOUD Act and e-Evidence proposal leave domestic
and regional protections for U.S. and EU citizens more-or-less intact, both
are likely to directly or indirectly result in weaker protections for people in
other jurisdictions. In contrast, the draft International Data Access Warrant
instrument has the potential to increase the strength of legal protections
worldwide.
As discussed above, executive agreements made pursuant to the
CLOUD Act contain few concrete legal protections for non-U.S. persons
whose data are obtained from U.S. companies.188 Rather than using the
legislation as an opportunity to impose higher standards, the authors appear
to simply have treated foreign human rights protections as a nuisance.
Additionally, both the CLOUD Act and e-Evidence proposal empower
U.S. and EU member state law enforcement agencies to demand data
located anywhere in the world outside of the MLA process. This sets a bad
precedent for states with weak protections in the context of government
data collection.189 Governments in these states will likely copy the U.S.
and EU approach, demanding data outside of the MLA process—thereby
depriving their nationals of the protections afforded by foreign law and
increasing the likelihood of human rights violations.190
In contrast, the draft proposal for the International Data Access
Warrant has the potential to reduce the risk of abuses of data collection

185
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unrelated to fundamental rights, national security, or defense prompts a balancing test, rather than
an absolute bar to data production.).
186
Katitza Rodriguez, The U.S. CLOUD Act and the EU: A Privacy Protection Race to the Bottom,
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powers, while increasing the strength of related human rights protections
around the world. Unlike the CLOUD Act’s slippery language, the myriad
of human rights protections upon which ratification is conditioned are
sufficiently specific and concrete to ensure that they are not interpreted in
ways that render them meaningless.191 Additionally, the international
judicial mechanism does not set a bad precedent for governments wishing
to increase the scope of data collection powers for unsavory purposes. In
fact, it requires states to relinquish power by narrowing the scope of
permissible domestic and cross-border data collection.
4. Summary
The draft proposal for the International Data Access Warrant is the
only instrument that would increase the speed and efficiency of crossborder data access, have a high likelihood of preventing violations of state
sovereignty and conflicts of law, and provide reliably strong human rights
protections. From a legal perspective, it is ideal. However, from a political
perspective, it is not.

IV. NEGOTIATING THE INTERNATIONAL DATA ACCESS WARRANT
PROPOSAL
A. WHY IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
Given the usual challenges associated with the creation of international
human rights treaties, and the degree to which states zealously guard their
surveillance powers in particular, the draft International Data Access
Warrant mechanism could be a hard sell. Yet its strengths merit the work
necessary to bring it to fruition. The CLOUD Act and, if enacted, eEvidence proposal could create breathing room to allow the U.S., EU, and
the rest of the international community to put a more sustainable solution
in place.
At a first glance, governments may understandably find the draft legal
instrument unrealistic. The creation of international human rights
instruments has never been an easy task.192 Negotiations are often long
and—given the diversity of political views represented—contentious.193
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These difficulties would be amplified in the context of a treaty concerning
online privacy and surveillance. Whether legitimate or cynical,
governments’ contemporary preoccupation with terrorism causes them to
stubbornly hold onto what are arguably disproportionate and unlawful
surveillance powers, and even call for expanded powers, in spite of
intensive reform efforts and contrary court decisions.194 Additionally,
MLAT reform is a time-sensitive issue, given OIA’s rapidly increasing
case burden, as well as the need to prevent the spread of data localization
and other problematic unilateral measures.
B. WHY IT IS WORTHWHILE
Nevertheless, the draft proposal warrants the effort it would take for
the U.S., EU, and other governments to actualize it. It would provide an
effective, long-term solution for speedy and lawful cross-border data
access that would prevent human rights abuses. It would not trigger a “race
to the bottom,” in which expansions of domestic power to access crossborder data give rise to more conflicts of law, violations of state
sovereignty, and weakened human rights protections worldwide. Human
rights protections would be a cornerstone, rather than an afterthought. At a
minimum, it would prevent the kinds of excesses and abuses seen in China,
with effective limitations on both cross-border data access and purely
domestic surveillance activities. Thus, governments should treat the
CLOUD Act and e-Evidence proposal as stopgap solutions and follow the
Special Rapporteur’s recommendation to start empowering their executive
branches to “actively explore” the draft legal instrument and similar
proposals.195
Once committed, governments may find the process easier than
expected. Governments worldwide would have a strong incentive to
support the proposal, given their urgent need for more rapid access to
cross-border data. Civil society would have a strong incentive to support
the proposal, as it would satisfyingly address both human rights advocates’
concerns about online privacy and data protection and companies’ desire to
avoid conflicts of law. Increasingly, privacy-conscious publics would
likely be receptive to this scheme. The Special Rapporteur expects that the
“number of states coalescing around newly-articulated principles and
newly created mechanisms could gradually grow to provide critical mass . .
. [and that this] time may be sooner than some may wish us to think.”196

CONCLUSION
That “[t]he natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of
power,” was noted by a congressional oversight committee in its 1976
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report about U.S. government surveillance.197 This is why “[c]lear legal
standards and effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that
domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic
system it is intended to protect.”198 The European Court of Human Rights
came to a similar conclusion two years later, when it noted that a law
affording a government unlimited discretion in domestic surveillance
created a “danger . . . of undermining or even destroying democracy on the
ground of defending it,” and therefore, required “adequate and effective
guarantees against abuse.”199
Consequently, the court and U.S. Congress mandated similar
independent judicial (or “preferably judicial” in the court’s judgment)
oversight requirements.200
Some argue that the increased volume and importance of electronic
evidence in contemporary law enforcement investigations necessitate
weaker procedural protections for individuals, because of the burden high
standards place on investigators. Yet if one bears in mind the purpose of
these protections—preventing the abuse of power—the increased volume
and importance of electronic communications in contemporary life, if
anything, demands stronger protections. This makes clear—as opposed to
ambiguous—legal standards and effective—as opposed to perfunctory and
impotent—oversight and controls are as indispensable today as they were
thirty years ago.
For that reason, a legal instrument governing cross-border data access
must prioritize human rights protections, rather than carelessly strip them
away. The instrument must also accommodate the borderless nature of the
Internet to avoid violations of state sovereignty and conflicts of law, while
expediting the process. The draft International Data Access Warrant
proposal would best accomplish these goals.
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